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Abstract
Human capital contracts give private investors the right to a share
of students' future earnings in return for a financial contribution during
their studies. Although still rarely used, human capital contracts could
not only help to complement limited public funding for higher education
but might also be an alternative to traditional financial assets. Using a
dataset covering 1% of German households for the period 1995-2009, we
analyse the return and risk properties that can be expected from human
capital contracts. We find that funds of human capital contracts provide
low risk exposures to stocks and bonds. As a result, risk-adjusted returns
of funds of human capital contracts are significantly positive under fairly
weak conditions. Thus, human capital contracts potentially offer large
diversification benefits for investors and might be a way to improve the
state's educational budget.
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1 Introduction
While there is the political will to invest more in higher education and to increase the
number of graduates (Council of the European Union, 2009), public financing of tertiary
education has come under pressure. In effect, the growing demand for tertiary education is
accompanied by increased expenditure on public pensions, health care or early childhood
education as well as the financial burden of the recent financial crisis. Boosting private
contributions to tertiary education may be one way to help to alleviate limited public
budgets.
Private expenditure on tertiary education has indeed increased strongly in the past decade,
even in countries with a low initial private share in the funding of tertiary education.
While public expenditures for tertiary education in OECD countries rose by 27 percent
from 2000 to 2007 on average, private expenditure doubled (see OECD (2010), Table
B3.2b). In Germany, public support of students was reformed over the last years. Grants
(Bafo¨g) were replaced partly by student loans and since 2010, students have to repay half
of the received public support after graduation.
In addition, the oncoming shortage of qualified labor in combination with a relative abun-
dance of the factor capital could lead to a decrease in the average rate of return to capital
investment by around 90 basis points until 2050 (Ludwig, Krueger, and Boersch-Supan,
2007). Even though this is only a rough estimate, derived from a highly aggregated
macroeconomic model, it shows that the ratio of wages to capital incomes is likely to in-
crease considerably in the long run. As a result, investors seeking to stabilize their yields
may be interested in alternative assets, in particular investments in human capital.
In this paper, we study the return and risk properties of hypothetical human capital
contracts. These are equity-like instruments allowing direct investment in human capital.
A typical human capital contract is designed as follows: an investor pays students a yearly
or monthly annuity for the duration of their studies. After graduation, the students
pay the investor a fixed share of their income for a certain period. Depending on the
achieved income, students may end up paying back more or less than the amount initially
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received. The financial return on a human capital contract depends both on the time of
reimbursement and on the share of income payable to the investor.
Human capital contracts as a way of securing private funding of higher education were
already advocated by Friedman (1955). And although the concept of human capital con-
tracts has spread in recent years, so far there have been only a limited number of attempts
to implement human capital contracts in real life (see e.g. Palacios (2004)).1 Yet, from
an economic perspective, the market for human capital contracts might be huge. Lustig,
van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2013) estimate that the human capital share of total
wealth is as large as 90%, whereas equity only contributes 2%. Put differently, if only
2.07% of human capital were eventually investable, in the form of human capital con-
tracts, this market would be bigger than the common stock market. In this light, human
capital contracts as equity-like instruments are a promising alternative to traditional fi-
nancial assets. Our analysis serves as a first empirical evaluation of their return and risk
properties.
We compute the return and risk properties of human capital contracts using the German
census for the period from 1995 to 2009. For each graduation vintage year, we derive the
cash flow to hypothetical funds of human capital contracts, and compute their abnormal
return (“alpha”) and risk exposures (“betas”) to common stocks and government bonds.
To this end, we apply a novel GMM estimator proposed by Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou
(2012), which makes it possible to estimate return and risk characteristics of non-traded
assets based on their cash flows.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, we replicate
and complement the analysis of Palacios-Huerta (2003), who assesses the value-added of
including human capital into a financial portfolio using US data. Based on traditional
mean-variance spanning tests (Huberman and Kandel (1987), Bekaert and Urias (1996)),
he finds that human capital would make a highly valuable complement to a financial
1Suppliers of human capital contracts in Germany include Deutsche Bildung, and CareerConcept,
and for America Lumni and Pave (see also “Start me up - crowdfunding students” available in the print
edition of “The Economist”, June 15th 2013). Palacios (2004) provides a comprehensive overview on
human capital contracts, also covering challenges real life funds of human capital contracts face and how
these can be overcome.
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portfolio.2 Our paper provides an improvement to the literature with respect to the
empirical design of the mean-variance spanning tests for human capital as we apply a
modification of the mean-variance spanning test, which takes market frictions in the form
of short sales constraints into account. This short sales restricted test was proposed by
DeRoon, Nijman, and Werker (2001) and was not used in Palacios-Huerta (2003).
Second, while our methodology to evaluate return and risk properties of human capital
contracts is consistent with mean-variance spanning tests, we base our analysis on cash
flows investors can realistically receive from human capital contracts. Previous studies
rely on measures based on labor income growth as a proxy of the return on human capital
(e.g. Fama and Schwert (1977), Becker (1993), Campbell (1996), Jagannathan and Wang
(1996), Palacios-Huerta (2003)). Using these measures in our context would imply that
the total amount of returns to education is considered to flow back into the fund whereas
in practice only a share of net income after graduation can flow into the fund. Moreover,
in contrast to our analysis, default risk is not taken into account in Palacios-Huerta (2003)
as only full-time workers are included and no cap on reimbursement or years of repayment
are considered.
We find that the risk exposures to stocks and bonds of human capital contracts are close
to zero. Consequently, the estimated alphas are significantly positive using conservative
assumptions, which means that students have to share only a modest amount of their
income with funds of human capital contracts. Our results are noteworthy in particular
compared to those reported in the literature for traditional and alternative investments
in physical capital. For the aggregate market of mutual stock funds, Fama and French
(2010) find alphas close to zero (before fees) and stock market betas of one. Driessen, Lin,
and Phalippou (2012) even report negative alphas and stock market betas of 1.5 (2.9) for
non-traded private equity funds (venture capital).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data, followed by a
2Similarly, Fama and Schwert (1977) find that the return on human capital does not improve the
capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), since their correlation with various
financial assets is weak. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Eiling (2013) find stronger correlations using
a different timing or industry specific labor income as a proxy for the return on human capital.
3
mean-variance spanning analysis as in Palacios-Huerta (2003) for our data in Section 3.
In Section 4 we present our approach to measuring the performance of human capital
contracts. Section 5 reports the baseline results of the return and risk estimates of human
capital contracts and presents results when specific conditions of human capital contracts
are varied, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We use the German Mikrocensus for the years 1995-2009, a yearly representative survey
dataset including 1% of all German households. This represents about 380,000 house-
holds with 820,000 individuals. The data is a repeated cross-section and, amongst others,
contains information on income, and experience as well as on education and employment
status. We restrict the sample by excluding soldiers, self-employed workers, workers that
participate in dual vocational education as well as school pupils, students, retired indi-
viduals, individuals under age 15 as well as individuals over age 55. Individuals with
a recognized disability are also excluded. We consider both a restricted sample of only
full-time workers in order to ensure comparability with Palacios-Huerta (2003), and the
full sample including unemployed and part-time workers.
The main variable of interest is the monthly net income. This includes the wage but also
unemployment benefits, and financial assistance from the state or the family if applicable
(in the full sample). The monthly net income is measured in a given month of the year:
in April until 2003, in March in 2004 and in the month before the survey date (that we
observe) from 2005 onwards.
For our mean-variance spanning tests in the the spirit of Palacios-Huerta (2003), we
distinguish three experience categories (3, 6 and 9 years of experience) to be able to
compare our results. The highest educational degree is classified into 4 categories: none
or up to a secondary school degree, a degree from 3-4 years of vocational training (“duale
Ausbildung”, equivalent to ISCED category 3B), a degree from an additional 1-2 years of
advanced vocational training (“Meister, Techniker”, equivalent to ISCED 5B) and a degree
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from tertiary education (university or university of applied sciences, equivalent to ISCED
5A (or higher)). For all other analyses we measure experience in years (1, 2, 3, ... 10
years of experience) and restrict the sample to those individuals with a higher educational
degree (tertiary education). Yearly information on education is available only from 1995
onwards.
3 Human Capital as an Asset Class
In this section, we evaluate the stochastic properties of human capital returns in Germany
with mean-variance spanning tests as in Palacios-Huerta (2003). We then discuss how our
measure of returns on human capital contracts differs from Palacios-Huerta’s measure of
human capital returns.
Mean-variance spanning tests consist of analyzing the effects of introducing an additional
asset to the investment opportunity set on a portfolio of benchmark assets on the mean-
variance frontier. In this sense, human capital investments constitute an improvement of
the portfolio performance if there is an increase in the expected return per unit of risk
when human capital is included in the portfolio of benchmark assets.
In Palacios-Huerta (2003), the utility from the discounted future gains from education is
equal to the utility of today’s wage:
we−1,t = Et (mt+1we,t+1) , (1)
where mt+1 = βu
′ (ct+1) /u′ (ct) is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS),
and we,t+1 is the wage when holding e units of education at time t + 1. Thus, defining
Rhe,t+1 = we,t+1/we−1,t as the marginal return to education leads to the central pricing
formula in finance (Cochrane (2005), Chapter 1):3
3Palacios-Huerta (2003) is the first using this kind of measure. In Footnote 4 of his paper, it is
acknowledged that this measure goes back to a suggestion by Kevin M. Murphy.
5
1 = Et
(
mt+1R
h
e,t+1
)
, (2)
where the equation becomes an inequality in the presence of market frictions such as short-
sales constraints (e.g. He and Modest (1995), Luttmer (1996)). Asset pricing models
differ in the exact specification of the IMRS, mt+1. Palacios-Huerta (2003) considers
mean-variance spanning tests which can be derived from a particular parametrization of
the IMRS, as described below.
It is well known that a set of benchmark assets span the mean-variance frontier if they
are able to price the test asset correctly (e.g. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), Bekaert
and Urias (1996)), that is, the IMRS
m∗t+1 (v, Rt+1) = v + b
′ (Rt+1 − E (Rt+1)) , (3)
satisfies Equation (2), where Rt+1 is a vector of N benchmark asset returns (e.g. stocks
and bonds) and b is a vector of coefficients defined in the Appendix. The intuition is that
if Equation (9) holds, all pricing relevant information is carried by the benchmark assets.
Put differently, the stochastic properties of the test assets can be fully replicated from
the benchmark assets and an investor cannot gain by investing in the test assets beyond
the gains available from the benchmark assets. If v is set to 1/(1 + rf ), the inverse of the
risk-free rate, Equation (2) implies a beta asset pricing representation:
Rhe,t+1 − rf = α + β (Rt+1 − rf1N) + εt+1, (4)
with the testable condition α = 0 for mean-variance spanning (see Huberman and Kan-
del (1987), Bekaert and Urias (1996), DeRoon and Nijman (2001)). The beta pricing
representation offers an intuitive economic interpretation as well. Positive alphas imply
that this component of the return cannot be replicated by the benchmark assets and the
investor will want to add the test asset (e.g. human capital) to their portfolio. Con-
trary, negative alphas indicate that the investor should take short positions in the test
6
asset. Further technical details are provided in the Appendix, which also covers a test
for mean-variance spanning with short sales constraints as proposed by DeRoon, Nijman,
and Werker (2001).
We provide results on mean-variance spanning tests in Table 1 in order to assess the
relevance of human capital in a portfolio context for the German market. To make our
analysis comparable with that of Palacios-Huerta (2003), we compute human capital
returns by gender, the level of education and experience. We distinguish three levels of
experience and include only full-time workers. The details on how we calculate Rhe,t+1 from
our data are reported in the Appendix. The benchmark assets are returns on European
stocks and ten year German government bonds.4 Besides the Wald test (HK) proposed by
Huberman and Kandel (1987), we compute a modification of the mean-variance spanning
test that explicitly takes short sale restrictions for human capital into account (DNW),
as suggested by DeRoon, Nijman, and Werker (2001). Furthermore, we report direct
estimates of alpha.
– Insert TABLE 1 about here –
In our mean-variance spanning analysis for Germany, we find similar results as Palacios-
Huerta (2003) finds for the US. As in the US, higher education constitutes a valuable
improvement for financial portfolios. Alphas of human capital at the level of university
degrees are in the range between 7.2% and 10% p.a. The HK-test statistics as well as
the DNW-test statistics indicate a significant portfolio improvement from adding human
capital to a portfolio of stocks and bonds. In contrast, for low educational levels, alphas
are (slightly) negative indicating the absence of diversification benefits if short sales are not
available. We find that the HK-test often falsely indicates significant benefits, since this
test does not take short-sale constraints into account.5 The DNW-test - which accounts
for short-sales constraints - allows us to draw the same conclusion as from estimtated
alphas in all the cases we consider.
4European stocks are proxied by the MSCI Europe total return index and German government bonds
by the BofA Merrill Lynch German Government bonds (7-10y) total return index, both available via
Thomson Reuters Datastream.
5The likelihood-ratio test counterpart of these test statistics is used in Palacios-Huerta (2003).
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The return measure used in the mean-variance spanning analysis above is the marginal
return to education for the individual, and is likely to overestimate the returns to human
capital available to concrete investment vehicles like human capital contracts. Firstly,
the cash flow implied by the measure of the return on human capital, i.e. paying we−1,t
in t and receiving we,t+1 in t + 1, is not achievable for investment vehicles. Secondly,
investment vehicles like human capital contracts are constructed such that only a fraction
of the return to education (typically between 5% and 10% of gross wage) flows back
to the fund. Thus, even though Rhe,t+1 is highly correlated with the return of human
capital contracts, it is not clear if a significant amount of the returns arrives at the fund
level under realistic assumptions. Finally, only full-time workers are taken into account,
thereby ignoring the risk of default in case of unemployment, non-participation in the
labor market or part-time employment.
In the next section, we compute cash flows of human capital contracts that funds can
realistically generate. Based on these cash flows, we calculate the abnormal return and
risk exposures of human capital contracts, relying on a methodology consistent with the
mean-variance spanning framework. Our main question is whether the shifts in the mean-
variance efficiency frontier are robust to this transformation of the returns on investment
in higher education.
4 Return and Risk of Human Capital Contracts
Human capital contracts (HCC) are one possible instrument of including human capital
into a financial portfolio. Investors give a certain number of students a yearly or monthly
amount of money for the duration of their studies. These students together constitute a
human capital fund for the investor. After graduation, these students pay a fixed share
of their net income to the investor for a fixed amount of time. Depending on the achieved
income, students may end up paying back more or less than the amount initially received.
The financial return to a human capital fund depends on the time of reimbursement as
well as on the share of net income that is to be paid into the fund by the students.
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4.1 Measuring the Performance of Human Capital Contracts
In order to assess the financial performance of human capital contracts, we compute their
internal rate of return (IRR), abnormal return (alpha), and the risk exposures to the stock
and bond markets (betas). The abnormal return cannot be replicated using investments
in stocks and bonds and is therefore particularly relevant to an investor. It is a measure
of the diversification benefits of the asset to be tested (human capital contracts) against
a portfolio of benchmark assets (bonds and stocks). We cannot directly use Equation (4)
to estimate alphas and betas of human capital contracts since we only observe cash flows
but not market returns. Instead, we rely on an indirect method proposed by Driessen,
Lin, and Phalippou (2012) to infer alphas and betas from cash flows.
The internal rate of return of the cash flow stream of human capital fund i = 1, ..., I is
computed by solving
Li∑
t=t0i
[
Dit − Tit
(1 + IRRi)
t−t0i
]
= NPV = 0, (5)
where t0i and Li are the start and the end date of the HCC, Dit are the repayments
(dividends), and Tit are the investments. NPV stands for the net present value of the
investment. Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2012) extend the standard approach of IRR
calculation by accounting for risk exposures. Instead of being constant, the discount rate
is allowed to vary over time. In our application it is equal to 1 + rf,t + α + βSrStocks,t +
βBrBonds,t, where rf,t is the risk-free rate, rStocks,t is the excess stock market return, and
rBonds,t is the excess bond market return. The coefficients α and β = [βS, βB] are assumed
to be identical for the I portfolios and are the parameters to be estimated.
Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2012) propose estimating α and β by solving the least
squares optimization
min
α,β
=
I∑
i=1
[NPVi (α, β)]
2 , (6)
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where
NPVi (α, β) =
Li∑
t=t0i
[
Dit − Tit∏t
s=t0i+1
(1 + rf,t + α + βSrS,t + βBrB,t)
]
. (7)
The basic idea of this estimator is to exploit the cross-section of portfolio net-present
values to identify the coefficients α and β. Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2012) show
that this estimator can be written as an asymptotically consistent GMM estimator and
provide numerical examples as well as a comprehensive simulation study.
This method for estimating risk-adjusted returns is consistent with the mean-variance
spanning tests in the previous section and Palacios-Huerta (2003). Importantly, this pro-
cedure allows us to base our estimates directly on cash flows that investors can realistically
expect rather than on a return measure such as Rhe,t+1 . As discussed above, the latter
bases on assumptions that are unlikely to hold in practice.
4.2 Human Capital Contract Conditions
We transform the wage distribution into a cash flow distribution for human capital con-
tracts by weighted re-sampling. The transformation function leaves some room for a
number of different calibrations. Below we outline the characteristics of our baseline fund
of human capital contracts. The robustness section of this paper covers a scenario anal-
ysis illustrating the sensitivity of the results to each of the different characteristics of the
HCC. We define our fund of human capital contracts as follows:
• In the investment phase the fund pays each student 8,000 Euros per year (deflated by
the 2009 consumer price index) for three years. This corresponds to the maximum
amount of public support for students from low-income families in Germany. This
amount is intended to cover living expenses for the duration of studies (college
attendance itself is free in Germany).
• In the repayment phase, starting with the first job after graduation, each student n
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pays Dnt = θ × incoment to the fund for the following nine years, where incoment
corresponds to net earnings after tax and social insurance.
• We consider repayments to the fund θ in the range between 10 and 20 percent of
net income. This corresponds to approximately 5 to 10 percent of gross earnings,
rates that are observed for existing funds.
• Unemployed individuals, those on social assistance or those on parental leave do not
make repayments into the fund.
• Each fund invests in one cohort of students. Tracking the cash flows of a specific
fund is equivalent to tracking the labour market performance of a specific cohort of
students. The first fund starts investing in 1992 and receives repayments starting
in 1995, ending in 2003. The cash flows of the second fund span the period 1993
to 2004. The cash flows of the seventh (and last) fund spans the period from 1998
to 2009. That is, we track a total of seven vintage years of students (seven funds)
covering a period of 18 years (1992-2009).
• We simulate human capital funds made up of 50 randomly chosen male and 50
randomly chosen female students.
For each fund we compute cash flows based on reported earnings and the transformation
function outlined above. Based on the resulting cash flow matrix for the seven vintage
funds, we compute internal rate of returns, alphas, and betas. We repeat this procedure
1,000 times to allow for inference on return and risk estimates.
Figure 1 shows the average earnings of cohorts of 50 male and 50 female graduates averaged
across the 1,000 simulations. We find earnings of the cohorts to increase by around 7,5%
per year of experience for males, and by 5% per year of experience for females.
– Insert FIGURE 1 about here –
Table 2 illustrates the funds’ cash flows per student averaged across the 1,000 simulations.
In the first three years, cash flows are negative because the fund allocates money to
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finance the students’ higher education. The nine years after graduation have positive
and increasing cash flows as the students’ incomes increase over time. We find that the
cross-sectional and time-series variation of earnings carries over to the fund cash flows.
Figure 1 and Table 2 are based on the sample including only full-time workers.
– Insert TABLE 2 about here –
Our analysis involves several simplifications due to the limitations of our data. First of
all, we assume that no student drops out of higher education. In practice, HCC include
a clause stipulating that in the case of dropout, the contract automatically becomes a
loan. This allows the fund to at least recover the invested amount. As a result, the
impact of student dropout on cash flows can safely be ignored. Secondly, all students
are assumed to complete their studies after three years. This will bias estimated returns
upwards since delays in repayment due to a longer time until graduation are not taken
into account. However, the students in the fund have a strong incentive to graduate
before their funding runs out. Moreover, in contrast to existing human capital funds
in Germany, our fund does not impose minimum grade requirements or other selection
procedures. This will bias the estimated returns downwards.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present our estimates of the performance of the hypothetical human
capital funds outlined above. We first compute the risk and returns of HCC using a
sample where only full-time workers are included. Results for the full-time workers sample
are directly comparable to the Palacios-Huerta (2003) results. In a second analysis, we
enlarge the sample to include part-time workers and individuals with no labor income.
This introduces a default risk since these persons do not make repayments into the fund.
Including part-time workers also reduces returns in that earnings are lower for this group,
making our analysis more realistic from the perspective of an investor. In a final step we
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perform a series of robustness checks by changing the duration of repayment, introducing
caps on the repayments and varying the number of students in a fund.
5.1 Full-Time Workers
Panel A of Table 3 gives the IRRs, alphas, and betas for our human capital fund when
only full-time workers are included. We consider a range of different values for the share
of net income (θ) that is re-payed to the fund θ = {10%, 12.5%, 15%, 17.5%, 20%}.
– Insert TABLE 3 about here –
We find that IRRs and abnormal returns α vary significantly with the share of net income
that is paid to the fund. The abnormal return is positive for shares of reimbursement equal
or larger than 12.5% of net income. The point estimates for the stock market beta and
the bond market beta are close to zero, or even slightly negative. This means that there
is little correlation between returns to education and returns on bonds or stocks. The low
level of systematic risk implies that HCC offer high potential diversification benefits, even
if the share of reimbursement is relatively modest.
We find that confidence intervals for bond market betas are about five times larger than
for stock market betas. This implies that investing in human capital as a complement
to a portfolio of stocks is a good asset diversification strategy with high certainty. This
remains more uncertain for portfolios of bonds.
Figure 2 illustrates this point visually and shows the sum of net present values (see
Equation (6)) as a function of the parameters to be estimated. Since stock and bond
market correlation is low, we estimate the univariate version of Equation (6) for the
average cash flow matrix across all simulations. The stock market is the only risk factor
in the upper part of the figure, and the bond market is the only risk factor in the lower
part of the figure. As indicated by the bootstrapped confidence intervals in Table 3, the
value function is flat along the dimension of the bond market beta. In contrast, the value
function is steep with respect to the alpha and the stock market beta.
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– Insert FIGURE 2 about here –
5.2 Default Risk
Results on full-time workers overstate the likely cash flows of human capital funds because
there is no default risk. We therefore also provide results for a broader sample that includes
unemployed individuals, individuals on parental leave, individuals dependant on family or
state support and part-time workers. These groups of people do not generate cash flows
to the fund. Figure 3 illustrates the default risk posed by non-performing human capital
contracts. It shows the fraction of workers who have no labor income in the extended
sample. We observe that the resulting risk of default is very limited as the default rate
lies below 10 percent in our sample over the time period considered.
– Insert FIGURE 3 about here –
Panel B of Table 3 presents IRRs, alphas, and betas for the human capital fund defined
in Section 4.2. using the extended sample of graduates. It shows the performance of our
human capital fund when taking into account the default risk arising from unemployment
and from non-participation in the labor market. As for the restricted sample of full-
time workers, stock and bond market betas of funds of human capital contracts are close
to zero. The internal rate of return is 2% lower in the extended sample (on average),
abnormal performance decreases by half but remains positive for values of θ of 15% and
higher. Therefore, even when default risk is taken into account, the performance of HCC
remains economically significant under realistic repayment conditions.
5.3 Robustness of Results
In addition to our analysis based on different samples of graduates we perform robustness
tests by modifying the conditions of the human capital contracts (Tables 4 and 5). First,
we include a cap on repayments such that individuals are left with a net income of at least
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1,300 Euros after making repayments to the fund.6 Second, we modify the idiosyncratic
risk of funds of human capital contracts by varying the number of HCC in a fund. Third,
we compute results for different durations of repayment: results are presented for 8 and
10 repayment years.
– Insert TABLE 4 about here –
– Insert TABLE 5 about here –
Introducing a repayment cap similar to that in place for public student loans reduces
abnormal performance by nearly half but it remains significantly positive for values of θ
of 15% and higher. Modifying the size of the human capital portfolio does not affect its
performance. However, confidence intervals on abnormal performance for the small funds
we simulate are approximately one percentage point larger than for the large funds.
The duration of the repayment period is very relevant for the performance of the human
capital fund. Shortening the repayment period to eight instead of nine years reduces the
performance of the human capital fund in a similar way as the inclusion of default risk.
Abnormal performance is reduced by half and positive for θ of 15% and higher.
A HCC including graduates that do not generate cash flows to the fund because of unem-
ployment or non-participation to the labor market and capping repayment so that 1,300
Euro remain with the graduate decreases abnormal performance by half when compared
with the sample including all graduates but without a cap on repayment. Moreover, the
abnormal performance is positive only for θ of 17.5% and higher.
In short, we find that funds of human capital contracts offer a promising investment
performance, even for a random sample of graduates including unemployed and part-time
workers. Our estimates on abnormal returns of HCC are considerably lower than the
returns to human capital found in Palacios-Huerta (2003) and are affected downwards by
less favorable conditions for the investor. Overall they remain large enough to indicate
6In Germany, income below 1300 Euro per month is exempt from execution. That is, when a debtor
defaults, his creditor cannot claim income under this threshold.
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significant diversification benefits of human capital for financial portfolios even under
conditions that are less favorable for the investor.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we assessed the return and risk performance of funds of human capital
contracts from the point of view of an investor. Our estimates are based on a novel GMM
estimator proposed by Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2012), which makes it possible to
calculate return and risk properties of non-traded assets using their cash flows. We find
that funds of human capital contracts have very low risk exposures to stock and bond
markets and generate positive abnormal returns under rather conservative assumptions.
These characteristics compare favorably with those of mutual funds and private equity,
which show high risk exposures and zero or negative abnormal returns.
The performance of human capital funds depends on the time of reimbursement and on
the share of net income to be paid back to the fund. Even if we assume conditions
of reimbursement that are less favorable for the investor and take into account default
risk, we find a reasonable performance of our human capital funds (though lower than
predicted in Palacios-Huerta (2003)). Including a cap on the repayments students have
to make, considering funds of human capital contracts with more or less idiosyncratic
risk and shorter times of reimbursement, we find that our estimates of risk exposures are
unaffected, and estimates of abnormal decrease by half. Our results indicate potentially
large diversification benefits for stock and bond investors who consider to add funds of
human capital contracts to their portfolio.
Issuing human capital contracts may also be a way for the state to provide additional
student support. By boosting public educational budgets through their high returns, they
might help to internalise some of the returns to the extensive human capital investments
made by European governments.
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Appendix
A Details on Mean-Variance Spanning Tests
Measuring human capital returns. An important empirical issue in when computing
Rhe,t+1 is how to link the data on we−1,t and we,t+1 in a sensible way. Palacios-Huerta (2003)
assumes that the level of education e corresponds to years of education. However, as in
Palacios-Huerta (2003), we do not observe the actual years of education but the attainment
of specific levels of qualification such as secondary school, vocational training (“Lehre”),
advanced vocational training (“Meister”), or university. To calculate the marginal return
from an additional year of education, we use the following approximation for the wage
e− 1:
we−1,t = we−g,t + (we,t − we−g,t) ye − ye−g − 1
ye − ye−g , (8)
where ye is the minimum number of years of education necessary to reach education level
e, and ye−g is the number of years of education necessary to reach the level of qualification
just below. In order to ensure comparability with Palacios-Huerta (2003), we use ye = 11
for a secondary school degree, ye = 14 for a vocational training (“Lehre”), ye = 16 for
an advanced vocational training (“Meister”), and ye = 18 for a university degree.
7 These
values correspond roughly to the years of schooling needed to achieve these qualification
levels in Germany. As a result, we set ye−g = 11 for secondary school, ye−g = 11 for
vocational training (“Lehre”), and ye−g = 14 for advanced vocational training (“Meister”)
and university degrees.
7Unfortunately, Palacios-Huerta (2003) does not provide details on how he handles this issue. However,
in an earlier working paper version it is assumed that e = 10 for “some high school”, e = 12 for “high
school graduates”, e = 14 for some college”, e = 16 for “college graduates”, and e = 18 for for “more than
college” (Palacios-Huerta (1997)).
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Mean-variance spanning tests. We say that a K-dimensional vector of Rt+1 bench-
mark assets spans an N-dimensional vector rt+1 of test asset returns if the candidate IMRS
m∗t+1 solves the pricing equation
E
(
m∗t+1 (v, Rt+1) rt+1
)
= 1N , (9)
where m∗t+1 (v, Rt+1) = v + b
′ (Rt+1 − E (Rt+1)) satisfies the pricing equation for the
K benchmark assets, E
(
m∗t+1Rt+1
)
= 1K , with b = V ar [Rt+1]
−1 (1− vE (Rt+1)), and
v = E (m) is related to the risk-free rate by 1 + rf = 1/E (m).
Test without market frictions. To derive a test statistic for the spanning hypothesis
from Equation (9) we rearrange terms
vE (rt+1) + Cov [rt+1, Rt+1]V ar [Rt+1]
−1 (1N − vE (Rt+1)) = 0N , (10)
and further simplifications (see e.g. DeRoon and Nijman (2001)) give
Λ (v) = va + (B1K − 1N) = 0N , (11)
where a and B can be found from the OLS regression:
rt+1 = a + BRt+1 + εt+1. (12)
The classical Huberman and Kandel (1987) test for spanning can be performed by com-
puting the Wald statistic:
HK (v) = Λ (v)′ V ar [Λ (v)]−1 Λ (v) . (13)
We only test for one specific value, v = 1, i.e. the inverse of the empirically observed
risk-free interest rate. That is, in terms of Huberman and Kandel (1987), we test for
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“intersection”rather than spanning. Setting v = 1/(1+rf ) means that we test the portfolio
with the maximum available Sharpe ratio in the mean-variance space (see DeRoon and
Nijman (2001)).
Relation to alpha. We can rewrite Equation (12) in terms of returns in excess of the
risk-free rate (instead of gross returns):
rt+1 − rf1K = α+ β (Rt+1 − rf1N) + εt+1. (14)
This expression is equivalent to the dynamic internal rate of return which we exploit to
discount net present values of human capital contracts (see Equation (7)). It can be shown
that the restriction that alphas are significantly different from zero is equivalent to the
Huberman and Kandel coefficient restriction in Equation (11)
Λ (v) = va + (B1K − 1N) = α = 0N , (15)
when testing for intersection of the portfolio with the maximum Sharpe ratio. Thus,
testing the significance of alphas, as we do for cash flows of human capital contracts, is
equivalent to performing tests using the Huberman and Kandel test statistic, as is done
in Palacios-Huerta (2003).
Test with market frictions. In the presence of short selling constraints, the equilib-
rium condition becomes an inequality (He and Modest (1995), Luttmer (1996)):
E (mt+1Rt+1) ≤ 1K . (16)
DeRoon, Nijman, and Werker (2001) show that the coefficient restrictions of Equation
(11) now become inequalities as well:
Λ (v) = va + (B1K − 1N) ≤ 0N . (17)
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To test these inequalities, DeRoon, Nijman, and Werker (2001) propose the test statistic
DNW (v) = min
{λ≤0}
(Λ (v)− λ)′ V ar [Λ (v)]−1 (Λ (v)− λ) , (18)
which offers the following intuition. A positive element of the N dimensional vector Λ (v)
means that the investor should give a positive portfolio weight to the specific test asset.
A negative element means that the investor should give a negative portfolio weight to the
specific test asset. However, under short sales constraint, the latter is not possible and λ
will account for this fact in the test statistic for spanning.
Test statistic distribution. Because our sample is relatively short, we do not want
to rely on the asymptotic distributions of our test statistics. We use 1,000 bootstraps to
derive the empirical distribution of all our test statistics.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of Risk Exposures
The figure shows the contour map of the value function, i.e. the sum of net present values (as in Equation
(6)), along the dimensions of the parameters to be estimated. Brighter areas in the figure correspond to
a lower net present value. Human capital fund cash flows used for estimation correspond to the average
cash flows of 1,000 bootstraps, as reported in Table 2 (θ = 0.15). Estimation is based on univariate stock
market risk in the upper part of the figure and on univariate bond market risk in the lower part of the
figure.
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Figure 3: Share of Non-Performing Human Capital Contracts
The figure shows the share of non-performing human capital contracts within a given fund when the
sample is not restricted to full-time employees, i.e. the share of graduates without any labor income.
Funds pay 50 male and 50 female students 8.000 Euros (deflated by the 2009 consumer price index)
each year for three years and receive a fraction of the graduates’ net earnings (after tax and social
insurance) during the following nine years. The fund’s vintage year indicates the first year the fund
receives repayments from the graduates. For instance, the fund with vintage year 1995 invests from 1992
to 1994 and receives dividends from 1995 to 2003. Students are randomly allocated to human capital
funds. Results display the mean of 1,000 bootstraps. The data come from the German Mirkocensus for
the period from 1995 to 2009.
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Table 2: Cash Flows of Human Capital Funds
The table reports average fund cash flows per student. Funds pay 50 male and 50 female students 8.000
Euros (deflated by the 2009 consumer price index) for three years and receive the fraction θ = 0.15 of
the students’ net earnings (after tax and social insurance) during the following nine years. The fund’s
vintage year indicates the first year the fund receives repayments from the students. For instance, the
fund with vintage year 1995 invests from 1992 to 1994 and receives dividends from 1995 to 2003. Students
are randomly allocated to human capital funds. The sample is restricted to full-time employees. Results
display the mean of 1,000 bootstraps. The data come from the German Mikrocensus for the period from
1995 to 2009.
Fund cash flows per student (Euros)
Vintage year
Payout
year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1992 -5,972 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 -6,231 -6,231 0 0 0 0 0
1994 -6,400 -6,400 -6,400 0 0 0 0
1995 2,339 -6,505 -6,505 -6,505 0 0 0
1996 2,393 2,181 -6,602 -6,602 -6,602 0 0
1997 2,455 2,392 2,280 -6,708 -6,708 -6,708 0
1998 2,611 2,436 2,411 2,510 -6,796 -6,796 -6,796
1999 3,083 3,040 2,614 2,622 2,189 -6,829 -6,829
2000 3,337 3,022 2,968 2,880 2,763 2,477 -6,917
2001 3,415 3,527 3,470 3,132 2,979 2,806 2,601
2002 3,820 3,661 3,623 3,568 3,313 3,313 2,958
2003 3,677 3,859 3,737 3,484 3,527 3,412 3,169
2004 0 4,268 3,862 3,526 3,520 3,637 3,056
2005 0 0 3,863 3,796 4,155 3,743 3,270
2006 0 0 0 4,068 4,057 4,008 3,709
2007 0 0 0 0 4,588 3,944 3,944
2008 0 0 0 0 0 4,417 4,300
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,414
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Table 3: Return and Risk of Human Capital Contracts
The table reports the internal rate of return (IRR), the abnormal return (α) and financial market risk
exposures (β) of funds of human capital contracts. Funds pay 50 male and 50 female students 8.000 Euros
(deflated by the 2009 consumer price index) for three years and receive a fraction θ of the students’ net
earnings (after tax and social insurance) in the following nine years. Students are randomly allocated
to human capital funds. In Panel A, the sample is restricted to full-time employees. The sample used
in Panel B also includes unemployed individuals, individuals on parental leave, individuals dependat on
family or state support and part-time workers. Abnormal returns and risk exposures to stocks and bonds
are calculated from human capital fund cash flows using a GMM estimator proposed by Driessen, Lin, and
Phalippou (2012). The procedure is repeated 1,000 times. The mean and the 95% confidence interval of
the estimated return and risk characteristics are displayed. The data come from the German Mikrocensus
for the period from 1995 to 2009.
Share of net earnings repaid to the fund (θ)
0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
Panel A: Full-time workers
internal rate of return
Mean IRR 0.07 3.66 6.78 9.57 12.10
95% conf. [-0.11 0.25] [3.47 3.85] [6.58 6.98] [9.36 9.77] [11.88 12.31]
abnormal return and risk exposures
Mean α -3.23 0.43 3.62 6.48 9.08
95% conf. [-4.14 -2.29] [-0.49 1.32] [2.70 4.50] [5.56 7.36] [8.17 9.99]
Mean βStocks -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
95% conf. [-0.12 0.05] [-0.13 0.04] [-0.13 0.03] [-0.14 0.03] [-0.14 0.02]
Mean βBonds -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10
95% conf. [-0.55 0.39] [-0.53 0.38] [-0.53 0.38] [-0.52 0.37] [-0.52 0.35]
Panel B: All (including non-employed and part-time workers)
internal rate of return
Mean IRR -1.61 1.87 4.90 7.60 10.05
95% conf. [-1.84 -1.39] [1.63 2.10] [4.64 5.15] [7.33 7.86] [9.77 10.32]
abnormal return and risk exposures
Mean α -5.12 -1.54 1.57 4.36 6.89
95% conf. [-6.16 -3.98] [-2.56 -0.43] [0.54 2.70] [3.31 5.46] [5.84 7.99]
Mean βStocks -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
95% conf. [-0.14 0.07] [-0.14 0.06] [-0.14 0.06] [-0.15 0.05] [-0.15 0.04]
Mean βBonds -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
95% conf. [-0.60 0.54] [-0.61 0.52] [-0.60 0.50] [-0.60 0.47] [-0.61 0.45]
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Table 4: Robustness - Full-time
The table reports the abnormal return (α) and financial market risk exposures (β) of funds of human
capital contracts. In each panel one of the human capital contract characteristics is changed as compared
with the baseline contract. In Panel A, repayments are capped such that graduates have an income of at
least 1.300 Euros per month (deflated by the 2009 consumer price index) after paying the fund. In Panel
B, funds invest in only 50 students, thereby increasing idiosyncratic risk. In Panel C, funds invest in 150
students, thereby reducing idiosyncratic risk. In Panel C, funds collect repayments for only 8 years after
graduation. In Panel D, funds collect repayments for as long as 10 years after graduation. The sample is
restricted to full-time employees.
Share of net earnings repaid to the fund (θ)
0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
Panel A: Repayments are capped (students have at least 1.300 Euros per month after paying to fund)
Mean α -4.10 -0.84 1.90 4.56 7.04
95% conf. [-5.24 -2.90] [-2.01 0.43] [0.72 3.11] [3.35 5.79] [5.75 8.35]
Mean βStocks -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11
95% conf. [-0.16 0.06] [-0.17 0.05] [-0.21 0.02] [-0.23 0.01] [-0.24 0.00]
Mean βBonds -0.17 -0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09
95% conf. [-0.75 0.44] [-0.73 0.50] [-0.63 0.62] [-0.65 0.62] [-0.73 0.58]
Panel B: More idiosyncratic risk (funds with 50 students)
Mean α -3.25 0.41 3.60 6.46 9.06
95% conf. [-4.43 -1.98] [-0.78 1.65] [2.42 4.83] [5.27 7.70] [7.89 10.35]
Mean βStocks -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
95% conf. [-0.16 0.08] [-0.17 0.07] [-0.17 0.06] [-0.18 0.05] [-0.19 0.05]
Mean βBonds -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08
95% conf. [-0.69 0.58] [-0.70 0.57] [-0.69 0.55] [-0.67 0.53] [-0.67 0.52]
Panel C: Less idiosyncratic risk (funds with 150 students)
Mean α -3.25 0.41 3.60 6.46 9.06
95% conf. [-3.96 -2.49] [-0.29 1.16] [2.89 4.34] [5.73 7.21] [8.31 9.80]
Mean βStocks -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
95% conf. [-0.12 0.04] [-0.12 0.03] [-0.12 0.02] [-0.13 0.01] [-0.13 0.01]
Mean βBonds -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
95% conf. [-0.47 0.32] [-0.46 0.30] [-0.46 0.29] [-0.46 0.29] [-0.46 0.29]
Panel D: Short duration funds (8 repayment years)
Mean α -5.42 -1.63 1.68 4.64 7.33
95% conf. [-6.68 -4.01] [-2.84 -0.29] [0.50 2.95] [3.49 5.84] [6.21 8.51]
Mean βStocks -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
95% conf. [-0.10 0.08] [-0.10 0.07] [-0.10 0.06] [-0.10 0.05] [-0.11 0.04]
Mean βBonds -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23
95% conf. [-0.86 0.33] [-0.81 0.30] [-0.78 0.28] [-0.75 0.27] [-0.73 0.27]
Panel E: Long duration funds (10 repayment years)
Mean α -1.33 2.18 5.25 8.01 10.52
95% conf. [-2.03 -0.57] [1.45 2.93] [4.50 6.04] [7.23 8.81] [9.73 11.37]
Mean βStocks -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
95% conf. [-0.15 0.06] [-0.15 0.05] [-0.16 0.04] [-0.16 0.04] [-0.17 0.03]
Mean βBonds -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
95% conf. [-0.52 0.38] [-0.50 0.38] [-0.49 0.38] [-0.48 0.37] [-0.48 0.36]
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Table 5: Robustness - All
The table reports the abnormal return (α) and financial market risk exposures (β) of funds of human
capital contracts. As inTable 4, in each panel one of the human capital contract characteristics is changed
but the sample is not restricted to full-time workers and also includes unemployed and part-time workers.
Share of net earnings repaid to the fund (θ)
0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200
Panel A: Repayments are capped (students have at least 1.300 Euros per month after paying to fund)
Mean α -6.32 -3.17 -0.54 2.01 4.41
95% conf. [-7.54 -5.01] [-4.46 -1.84] [-1.83 0.81] [0.70 3.40] [3.04 5.86]
Mean βStocks -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11
95% conf. [-0.20 0.08] [-0.21 0.08] [-0.24 0.05] [-0.25 0.04] [-0.26 0.03]
Mean βBonds -0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.01
95% conf. [-0.75 0.66] [-0.73 0.69] [-0.63 0.81] [-0.67 0.79] [-0.76 0.77]
Panel B: More idiosyncratic risk (funds with 50 students)
Mean α -5.08 -1.51 1.60 4.38 6.91
95% conf. [-6.50 -3.45] [-2.93 0.16] [0.18 3.25] [2.95 5.99] [5.49 8.52]
Mean βStocks -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
95% conf. [-0.18 0.12] [-0.18 0.11] [-0.19 0.10] [-0.19 0.09] [-0.19 0.08]
Mean βBonds -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
95% conf. [-0.82 0.77] [-0.82 0.73] [-0.83 0.71] [-0.80 0.69] [-0.81 0.67]
Panel C: Less idiosyncratic risk (funds with 150 students)
Mean α -5.12 -1.54 1.58 4.36 6.89
95% conf. [-5.97 -4.21] [-2.40 -0.64] [0.73 2.49] [3.50 5.30] [6.00 7.83]
Mean βStocks -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
95% conf. [-0.12 0.05] [-0.12 0.05] [-0.13 0.04] [-0.13 0.03] [-0.13 0.03]
Mean βBonds -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
95% conf. [-0.48 0.42] [-0.49 0.39] [-0.49 0.38] [-0.50 0.36] [-0.51 0.35]
Panel D: Short duration funds (8 repayment years)
Mean α -6.95 -3.29 -0.10 2.75 5.35
95% conf. [-8.50 -5.19] [-4.81 -1.63] [-1.55 1.46] [1.35 4.23] [3.96 6.84]
Mean βStocks 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
95% conf. [-0.07 0.14] [-0.08 0.12] [-0.08 0.11] [-0.09 0.10] [-0.09 0.09]
Mean βBonds -0.40 -0.38 -0.36 -0.35 -0.35
95% conf. [-1.13 0.29] [-1.05 0.26] [-1.00 0.27] [-0.96 0.27] [-0.94 0.26]
Panel E: Long duration funds (10 repayment years)
Mean α -3.20 0.22 3.21 5.90 8.34
95% conf. [-4.06 -2.25] [-0.65 1.20] [2.30 4.21] [4.96 6.93] [7.39 9.42]
Mean βStocks -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
95% conf. [-0.18 0.08] [-0.19 0.07] [-0.20 0.06] [-0.20 0.06] [-0.21 0.05]
Mean βBonds 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
95% conf. [-0.50 0.57] [-0.50 0.55] [-0.49 0.53] [-0.50 0.52] [-0.51 0.52]
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